4 Years of Reforming the Federal System
By Nikolai Petrov
At the start of Vladimir Putin's first term as president, the question was: "Who is Mr. Putin?" As his first term comes to a close, the time has come to assess the results of his first and most important policy initiative: reform of the federal system. Putin launched his program of essentially "anti-federal" reforms immediately after his inauguration in May 2000. The main points of this program were: . The creation of seven federal districts headed by envoys appointed directly by the president; . The weakening of the Federation Council as the focus of gubernatorial power in Moscow, achieved by moving the governors into the State Council, a consultative body that meets with the president four times per year; . The creation of a mechanism allowing federal intervention in regional affairs, including the power to remove elected regional leaders from office and to dissolve regional legislatures. Federal reform got underway quickly and with very little public debate. The newly-formed federal districts were designed to coincide with the Interior Ministry's troop districts. As his envoys, Putin chose five generals and two top-level (or former top-level) government officials. Their offices, like those of the chief federal inspectors who represent the president in each of Russia's 89 regions, were staffed largely with former agents of the security services. The seven envoys have enjoyed varying degrees of success, but only one district - the Northwest District - has seen leadership changes (twice in 2003). The envoys are members of the Security Council, reporting to the president twice annually on their districts. The president meets biannually with all of his envoys and federal inspectors, and also meets regularly with the envoys on an individual basis. Once the envoys' offices were up and running, district-level branches of all security and law enforcement agencies were created with the exception of the FSB, which provided oversight of the federal reform process. And many other federal agencies have followed suit. The aims of Putin's federal reform are not yet entirely clear, but policy statements made over the years have stressed five main points: bringing regional laws into line with federal legislation; coordinating operations of the regional branches of federal agencies; improving the investment climate and developing small and medium-sized businesses in the regions; clearly demarcating the powers and competencies of federal, regional and local authorities; stepping up the war on crime. None of these goals necessarily requires the appointment of generals or the creation of a burgeoning district-level bureaucracy. And this suggests that the federal districts are destined to play a greater and perhaps a very different role in future than they do at present. The seven federal districts are quickly emerging as a new level in Russia's state structure aimed at consolidating economic and cultural activity, and the flow of information within their boundaries. The proliferation of district-level branches has created not a single chain of command but a complex tangle of such chains within the various federal agencies. In order to extend this structure downward, a network of local "outreach" offices is being developed to cater to the public. Regional authorities have lost control over the regional field offices of federal agencies. Employees are now regularly rotated to disrupt local ties and promote loyalty to Moscow. The former links between regional authorities and law enforcement agencies, the courts and business have been broken. The presidential envoys are the primary conduit between Moscow and the regions, pushing the implementation of federal programs and arranging nearly all contacts between governors and the president. Increasingly they control business contacts in their districts, even at the international level. Economic development plans for all seven districts have been drawn up. The Kremlin has made good use of gubernatorial elections to strengthen its hand in the regions. Putin's envoys pushed successfully to install FSB bigwigs in the governor's mansion in the Voronezh and Smolensk regions and Ingushetia, although similar hardball tactics backfired in the Kursk and Tver regions. But even without a change of governor, Moscow has tightened its grip on the regions by beefing up the regional offices of federal agencies, sending its hand-picked candidates to the Federation Council and taking control of regional business. All the same, it should be stressed that the envoys are intermediaries, not independent powerbrokers. For all their trying, they have never gotten direct control over financial flows in their districts. The question of power lies at the heart of reform of the federal system. This does not mean declaring war on the governors, but establishing control over the so-called power agencies (the armed forces, security and law enforcement agencies) and the regions while bypassing the presidential administration, where the influence of Yeltsin-era officials has until recently remained strong. Taking control of the power agencies at the regional level required more than just a change of leadership, their ties to the regional authorities had to be broken. The first step was a major shake-up within the regional power agencies. The second step, carried out between April 2001 and March 2003, involved wholesale leadership changes in these agencies and the reorganization of the power agencies as a whole. The reform effort was directed at first from the Security Council, drawing heavily on the human resources of the FSB. The federal districts were matched to the Interior Ministry's troop districts because these forces were not under Defense Ministry control and enjoyed significant autonomy within the Interior Ministry itself. So why do the envoys wear epaulets? The siloviki have been behind the reform program from the beginning. Generals are needed to issue and carry out orders. And besides, who else could manage the siloviki in the regions and on the staff of the envoys and the federal inspectors? We can say now that the envoys have accomplished the main tasks initially set before them. They are now thrown into all of the president's major initiatives, from the census to doubling GDP and reviving Russian culture - although generals aren't needed for this kind of work. We have seen one general replaced by a former cabinet member in St. Petersburg. Rumor has it that Viktor Kazantsev will soon be replaced in the Southern Federal District. But it seems to me that the districts will be around for a while yet. As the nexus of innumerable federal agencies, they have acquired enormous inertia. The districts are the key element in a new, centralized network consisting of three levels: envoys, inspectors and local "outreach" offices that are open to the public. Most importantly, the districts have become so ingrained in the political system that ripping them out could cause the entire structure to collapse. But the presidential envoys' glory days are behind them. Federal reform is entering a new phase of more routine work on strengthening the vertical and horizontal structures of power, consolidating the regions, forming municipal districts and smoothing the functioning of "managed democracy" at all levels. It's worth bearing in mind that the seven federal districts are not merely an extension of the power agencies - they are the foundation of the Putin regime. They are essential to his vision of a monolithic society organized along more or less military lines - strict subordination, the clear division of responsibilities, chain of command and state control of business and the institutions of civil society. The point of Putin's federal reform policy is to divert all power to the federal center in order to bolster the power of the Kremlin and force regional law enforcement agencies to toe the line. The success of this policy means that Putin is well on the way to achieving the primary goal of his first term: absolute power. Nikolai Petrov, a scholar-in-residence at the Carnegie Moscow Center, contributed this comment to The St. Petersburg Times.
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